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Draft Discussion Paper for Panel on "Accomplishments of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism" at "Conference on WTO at 10", Tokyo, Japan, 25 October 2005 This paper examines the operation and accomplishments of two under-studied aspects of the WTO dispute settlement system -the consultation process and the implementation results. After a brief summary of the operation of the WTO dispute settlement system -focusing on consultations and the implementation process -the paper examines in detail the results of consultations and the record on implementation. As part of that examination, it examines various proposals on consultations and implementation that have been made over the years in the ongoing dispute settlement reform negotiations.
I.
Brief Overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process 2 An effective dispute settlement system is critical to the operation of the World Trade Organization. In the words of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, it "is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system". 3 There are essentially four phases in the WTO dispute settlement process: consultations, the panel process, the appellate process and surveillance of implementation.
The first step in the process is consultations. A WTO member may ask for consultations with another member if the complaining member believes that the other member has violated a WTO agreement or otherwise nullified or impaired benefits accruing to it. The goal of the consultation stage is to enable the disputing parties to understand better the factual situation and the legal claims in respect of the dispute and to resolve the matter without further proceedings. The DSU provides that " [t] he aim of the 1 The conclusions drawn are somewhat tentative, as additional information about some disputes is needed in order to analyze them. 2 A more detailed description of the WTO dispute settlement system, from which this section is taken, can be found at William J. Davey, "The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism" (June 25, 2003 dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the [WTO] agreements is clearly to be preferred." 4 If consultations are requested under Article XXII of GATT 1994 or the equivalent provision of another WTO agreement, 5 WTO members with a substantial trade interest may request to be joined in the consultations as third parties. 6 If the member asked to consult agrees that the claim of substantial interest is well-founded, the request to join will be honored. If, however, consultations are requested under Article XXIII (or its equivalent), there is no provision for third parties to join in the consultations.
The manner in which the consultations are conducted is up to the parties. The DSU has no rules on consultations beyond that they are to be entered into in good faith and are to be held with 30 days of a request. Typically, they are held in Geneva and involve capital-based officials, as well as the local WTO delegates of the parties. During the consultations, both parties are likely to try and learn more about the facts and the legal arguments of the other party. Written questions may be exchanged and written answers requested. Despite the fact that the structure of consultations is undefined and there are no rules for conducting them, as explained below, consultations lead to settlements (or at least the apparent abandonment of a case) in respect of a significant number of consultation requests.
If consultations fail to resolve the dispute within 60 days of the request for consultations, the complaining WTO member may request the DSB to establish a panel to rule on the dispute. 7 Pursuant to the DSU, if requested, the DSB is required to establish a panel no later than the second meeting at which the request for a panel appears on the agenda, unless there is a consensus in the DSB to the contrary. 8 Thus, unless the member requesting the establishment of a panel consents to delay, a panel will be established within approximately 90 days of the initial request for consultations. After the panel is established by the DSB, three individuals are selected -by agreement of the parties or by the Director-General -as panelists. 9 A panel normally meets with the parties shortly after its selection to set its working procedures and time schedule. The standard proposed timetable for panels makes provision for two meetings between the panel and the parties to discuss the substantive issues in the case. Each meeting is preceded by the filing of written submissions and often followed by panel questions addressed to the parties. After completing the fact-gathering and argument phase, the panel issues a draft of the "descriptive part" of its report, which summarizes the arguments of the parties and on which the parties may submit comments. Following receipt of comments, the panel issues its "interim report", which contains the descriptive part as revised, as well as the If a party fails to implement the report within the reasonable period of time, the prevailing party may request compensation. 17 If that is not forthcoming, it may request the DSB to authorize it to suspend concessions (i.e. take retaliatory action) owed to the non-implementing party. 18 DSB authorization is automatic, absent consensus to the contrary, subject to arbitration of the level of suspension if requested by the nonimplementing member. 19 The rules on suspension of concessions work without problem when it is agreed that there has been no implementation. However, if there is a 10 Appellate Body Working Procedures, rule 4(3). 11 Appellate Body Working Procedures, rule 6(2). 12 DSU, art. 17.5. Except for the first few cases, 90 days has been the standard. 13 As a consequences, WTO remedies are typically viewed as prospective in nature. There is no reparation of past damage awarded. 14 disagreement over whether there has been satisfactory implementation, the provisions of the DSU do not work harmoniously. On the one hand, Article 21.5 of the DSU provides that such a disagreement shall be referred to the original panel, where available, which shall issue its report in 90 days. At the same time, Article 22.2 of the DSU provides that if a member fails to bring its nonconforming measure into compliance, the DSB must authorize (if requested and absent consensus to the contrary) the suspension of concessions within 30 days of the expiration of the reasonable period of time. An Article 21.5 proceeding would normally not be completed within 30 days of the expiration of the reasonable period of time. As a consequence, a number of questions arise. Can the procedures be followed simultaneously or must the Article 21.5 procedure precede the Article 22 procedure? Can the deadline for DSB authorization of suspension pursuant to the negative consensus rule be suspended until completion of an Article 21.5 proceeding? While these questions have yet to be formally resolved, the current practice is to start both procedures and suspend the Article 22 proceeding pending the outcome of the Article 21.5 proceeding and to agree that the negative consensus rule will apply at the end of the Article 22 proceedings.
In light of this general outline of the WTO dispute settlement procedures, I now turn to a more detailed examinations of the results of consultations and the implementation of panel reports.
II.
Results Overall, this suggests that the consultation process has worked rather effectively. Almost all of the cases examined were disposed of. However, it is useful to try to analyze the results in some more detail, particularly in respect of the cases where there was no formal announcement of settlement.
B.
Type of Result
There are various ways that the results of a consultations can be categorized. For the WTO member who initiates the consultations, the clearest favorable result is achieved when the measure at issue is withdrawn and not replaced, even though the measure may have had some negative impact on its trade while it was in force. Potentially less favorable is the situation where the measure is withdrawn, but is replaced with another measure, which may have WTO-consistency problems of its own. A favorable settlement 28 India Import Restrictions (DS279, also DS149); US Section 337 (DS186); Brazil Import Prices (DS197); US Carousel (DS200). These cases should probably be viewed as dropped. Although the relevant authorities consider them to be open, there have been no reported consultations in the latter three cases for over five years. It is clear, however, that if the US were to take certain actions under Section 337 or the carousel provision, the EC would restart these cases or start new cases. The US case against Brazil and the EC case against India are in the nature of perennial complaints about the practices of those two countries. If a specific problem arises, it is likely that a new consultation request would be filed. may also be achieved when the consultations lead to a favorable change or clarification in the way that the measure at issue is to be applied. It is difficult to assess these differences in the case of consultations where the complaining party has generally accepted a settlement of the case. The act of settlement indicates that the complainant is satisfied with result, regardless of whether the settlement is effected by a withdrawal, modification or clarification of the measure. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, whether the measure was withdrawn, modified or clarified would not seem to much matter. Accordingly, I count the results of settlements as having appropriately resolved the dispute, although it should be noted that in four cases, the settlement was considered to be only a partial resolution of the dispute.
In contrast, with respect to the dropped cases, there was, of course, no agreed settlement. In such cases, it is useful to consider whether the contested measure was removed or not, and if not, what action, if any, by the respondent led to the dropping of the case. In this regard, I have noted two types of dropped cases -(i) those where a challenged trade remedy measure was either not imposed or was terminated within 18 months and (ii) others. Given the time taken to process a dispute in the WTO system, the non-appearance or disappearance of the measure within 18 months is probably the best result that the dispute settlement system can guarantee through formal proceedings. Thus, the former type of case would seem to provide a satisfactory result for the complainant, except, of course, for the trade disruptive effect while the measure was threatened or in force.
As to the other dropped cases, it appears that they were resolved as follows: The first category -removed non-trade remedies -gives a completely satisfactory result to the complainant. 34 In the next three types of cases, there appears that there was nothing in the way of useful results obtainable from pursuing WTO dispute settlement. The same may be true of the "other" category, as the legal basis for the claims is not clear.
Overall, complainants seem to have done well in achieving results through WTO consultations, although it sometimes takes considerable time, as discussed in the next section. There does not seem to be any particular pattern as to the type of settlement obtained as between developed and developing countries, whether as complainants or respondents.
35
C.
Timing of Results
One major complaint about WTO dispute settlement that is often made by businesses is that it takes too long to get results. In examining the cases where settlements were achieved in consultations, the following indicates how long it took to achieve those settlements. This exercise is by its very nature rather imprecise, but some useful general indications can be established. The imprecision arises from the difficulty in fixing the starting and end points to be used. While the underlying problem typically arises prior to the request for consultations, I have used the date of the request for consultations for the starting point of the timing measurement. I have used the date that the settlement was (or was agreed to be) implemented where available and the date of the settlement where that is not known to me. Both of these choices tend to understate the period during which trade was adversely affected by the challenged measure, but they do tend to focus on the time that the dispute was "in" the WTO dispute settlement system. Although the strength of the legal claims is not apparent to me, it may be that the cases were not pursued to the extent that they could have because of resource constraints. It may also be possible that the latter three were not pursued because of political reasons arising out of India's overall relationships with the respondents. 34 In one instance, the resolution may not have been all that timely -India Export Commodities (DS120). 35 More work needs to be done to be satisfied with this conclusion, but such differences are not immediately apparent. 36 These numbers underscore that the consultations process serves a very valuable function. It provides a mechanism that resolves most cases much more promptly than the formal panel/AB process.
D. Summary
Overall, the consultations process seems to work quite well for cases that do not go on to the formal panel/AB process.
III.
Implementation A.
Overview
Of the 181 disputes started with a consultation request prior to July 1, 2002, there were 74 disputes where panels had issued reports as of September 2005. As of that date, one of those disputes involved a pending case, in the sense that the reasonable period of time for implementation had not expired. 42 Of the remaining 73 disputes where reports had been adopted, 43 the complainant lost in 10 of them, such that no implementation was required. 44 Of the 63 other disputes, there had been implementation in 53. 45 That leaves 10 disputes where there had been no implementation or a disagreement between the parties over implementation. 46 That suggests a successful implementation rate of 83%, 47 which is fairly successful for state-to-state dispute settlement. . 43 The WTO on its website lists more reports as having been adopted as of this date. The difference is explained by the fact that this study counts a number of cases, where multiple reports were issued, as involving one dispute. To get a truer picture of the results of WTO dispute settlement, however, it is necessary to look at the form of implementation -was the problem measure removed or modified or essentially maintained? How long did it take to achieve the results? B.
Form of Implementation
As in the case of consultations, there are various possibilities that may be utilized in implementing a panel report. Since there is no often no agreement on implementation, it is useful to breakdown the cases along the following lines. The clearest favorable result is achieved when the measure at issue is withdrawn and not replaced. Potentially less favorable is the situation where the measure is either (i) modified -a not uncommon result in antidumping and countervailing duty cases or (ii) withdrawn, but replaced with another measure. In either situation, the modified or new measure may have WTOconsistency problems of its own. In fact, for a period of time (roughly 1999-2002) , there seemed to be fairly frequent resort to DSU Article 21.5 proceedings, which provide a mechanism for testing whether an implementation measure is WTO consistent. The frequent invocation of these proceedings underlines the problem of modified or replacement measures.
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In examining how various members have implemented adverse dispute settlement findings, it is instructive to consider how the form implementation has often followed some clear patterns by agreement. To be more specific, it appears that dispute settlement proceedings involving safeguard cases under the Safeguards Agreement or the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing typically lead to a withdrawal of the measure. 50 Of course, the time taken by the dispute settlement proceedings means that the defaulting country in effect achieves its protection goals for a considerable period of time. Nonetheless, the cases tend to be definitively resolved by the expiration of the reasonable period of time. The same appears to be true of TRIPS violations. Essentially, the grouped with DS236 & 247). Concessions are currently suspended in the Hormones and Byrd Amendment cases. 47 To focus on the rate of implementation at any given point of time may give a misleading impression of the operation of the WTO dispute settlement system. Typically, the results of panel/AB reports are eventually implemented. 48 The WTO success rate is comparable to the rate achieved by the GATT dispute settlement system through 1989. Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law ch. 11 (1993) . It is probably true, however, that some difficult cases were never brought to the GATT system because of the right of the losing party to "block" any adverse consequences of a decision against it. Moreover, the success rate of the GATT system declined considerably in the 1990's. In this regard, it is interesting to compare the success rate of the ICJ. defaulting country to date has removed the TRIPS-inconsistency, if it has attempted to implement at all. 51 In contrast, in antidumping and countervail cases, the typical result has been a modification of the challenged measure, which in many cases has not resulted in a significant reduction in the trade impact of the measure. For example, of the 17 disputes involving successful challenges to individual AD/CVD measures, 52 the challenged measure was revoked in four cases; 53 was revoked in three other cases, but only after a 21.5 proceeding challenging implementation had been commenced; 54 was significantly reduced in three cases; 55 and was not significantly reduced in seven cases. 56 SPS cases have also presented implementation problems because measures have been only modified. Thus, most SPS cases have been resolved, if at all, only after a considerable period of time and in two of the four cases, after a 21.5 proceeding. 57 There have been a number of straight subsidy cases under the SCM Agreement. The implementation problems with those cases typically have involved a refusal to stop providing subsidies immediately or to not pay those already granted. Cases arising under the Agricultural Agreement also seem to have often involved modified measures that raised problems. 58 Indeed, almost all of the Article 21.5 cases have involved the Ag, AD, SCM and SPS agreements.
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With the exception of GATT-based cases, it is difficult to draw any conclusions as to the type of implementation and potential problems in respect of the other WTO agreements because there have been an insufficient number of cases. As to the many GATT cases, in most instances, the cases have involved specific legal provisions applicable to specific products -often ones that violate antidiscrimination rules. For the 51 India Patents (DS50 & 79); Canada Patents (DS114); Canada Patent Term (DS170). 52 These cases are described and analyzed in more detail in Davey, supra note 49. For purposes of this analysis, I have counted the US Lumber AD and US Lumber CVD cases separately. 53 Argentina Ceramic Tile; Argentina Poultry; Guatemala Cement (because Mexico's first attempt to challenge the measure in the WTO was rejected on procedural grounds, the measure was ultimately in force for over four years); US Lead & Bismuth Steel. 54 US DRAMS; EC Bed Linen; Mexico HFCS (the challenged antidumping measure was in a sense "replaced" by a tax that has since been found to discriminate against imports in a WTO-inconsistent manner). 55 US Stainless Steel; US CVD (EC-12) (some measures were revoked; others saw a significant reduction in duties; others were involved in an Article 21.5 proceeding; the reductions were a result of a combination of US court decisions and WTO implementation). 56 US Hot Rolled Steel; US Steel Plate (significant reduction, but remained at 42%); US Lumber AD (increase, which was challenged in pending 21.5 proceeding); US Lumber CVD (NAFTA panel rulings seem to have led to significant reductions); EC Tube; Egypt Rebar; Thailand H-Beams. 57 EC Hormones (implementation in dispute); Australia Salmon (implementation only after 21.5 proceeding); Japan Agricultural Products (implementation after long delay); Japan Apples (implementation after 21.5 proceeding). 58 Canada Dairy (two 21.5 proceedings); EC Poultry (complaint of non-compliance not pursued); Chile Price Band (complaint of non-compliance not pursued). 59 The exceptions are EC Bananas and US Shrimp. The other fourteen 21. most part, these cases have resulted in the discriminatory or other WTO-inconsistent measure being repealed. 60 In some cases, measures have been modified, with some elements of discrimination possibly being maintained. 61 Developing countries seem to have fared as well as developed countries in obtaining results in respect of implementation of panel/AB reports. As noted, they are more responsible in implementing adverse decisions overall. As to having to deal with foot-dragging by respondents that seems to be a matter of principal concern in developed country vs. developed country disputes.
62
Timing of Implementation
While implementation typically occurs, as discussed above, it is often delayed, particularly when the challenged measure is replaced or modified, as opposed to being withdrawn. Thus, a considerable period of time elapses between the commencement of a case by consultation request and final implementing action. 63 1.
Implementation Overall
As of December 2004, roughly 60% of panel reports requiring implementation had been implemented promptly -either within the original reasonable period of time for implementation or shortly thereafter. In addition, another 20% had been implemented, albeit with significant delay (the average delay after the time set for implementation was 13 months, as indicated in Table 3 ). Of the remaining cases, six of them (10%) involved situations where there was a dispute over implementation. In three of them, there would have been prompt implementation if the respondent prevailed in a 21.5 proceeding, but they did not; 64 while the other three cases will in any event involve significantly delayed implementation even if the most recent measure is found to be WTO consistent. 65 As to the remaining six cases (10%), where non-implementation was admitted, it was unclear when they will be implemented. 60 US Gasoline (one discriminatory element expired; the other was modified and not subsequently challenged, although questions were raised); Japan Alcohol Taxes; Canada Periodicals; Indonesia Autos; Korea Alcohol Taxes; India Quantitative Restrictions; Turkey Textiles; Chile Alcohol Taxes; Canada Autos; Korea Beef; US Certain Measures; India Autos; EC Tariff Preferences; Canada Wheat Board. Argentina Hides (note that the EC does not accept full implementation). 61 EC Bananas (21.5 proceeding, followed by a waiver and arbitration proceedings aimed at a 2006 settlement); US Gasoline (see preceding note). 62 See Table 2 . 63 This section is based on William J. Davey, Implementation in WTO Dispute Settlement: An Introduction to the Problems and Possible Solutions, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 05-E-00X (on RIETI website as of March 2005). 64 The three cases are the US EC-12 case, the Japan Apples case and the US Lumber CVD case. The US lost in respect of two of the three measures challenged in the EC-12 case and Japan lost in the Apples case and neither appealed. The US lost in the Lumber CVD case and has appealed. 65 The three cases are EC Hormones (53 months); US FSC (49 months); US 1916 Act (39 months). (I would note that implementation may have been tacitly accepted in the 1916 Act case, although there are transitional issues that may become relevant depending on the results of pending cases.)
As indicated in Table 3 , non-implementation is primarily a problem of the United States (four of six cases) and delayed implementation is primarily a problem of the Quad (the US, the EC, Japan and Canada) plus Australia (12 of 15 cases). 66 Developing countries have usually implemented within the original reasonable period of time (81%) or within five months thereafter (9%). Only twice has a developing country been the subject of an Article 21.5 proceeding (Mexico HFCS and Brazil Air) and only in one case is non-implementation by a developing country a long-standing problem (Brazil Air). This means that any solution attempting to address the problems of non-implementation and delayed implementation must deal effectively with foot-dragging by the Quad countries.
Implementation Record by WTO Agreement
It appears that the implementation record varies significantly depending on the WTO agreement at issue. As Table 4 indicates, there are no implementation problems with safeguard cases, of which there have been 10. Of course, the time taken to attack a safeguard in the WTO allows it to exist long enough so that it probably serves its purpose before its removal is required. Nonetheless, safeguards have been promptly removed when found to be in violation of WTO rules. It is also interesting that GATT cases, of which there have been 18, have also generally not presented implementation problems. As indicated in Table 4 , 12 of the 16 GATT cases were promptly implemented and of the four that were not, only EC Bananas was significantly delayed, as the other three cases were implemented within 5 months of the expiration of the reasonable period of time.
In terms of the implementation record under the various WTO agreements, there have been three particular problem areas. Probably the most difficult area has involved subsidies. Of the four cases, two have not been implemented at all (the Canada/Brazil regional aircraft subsidies dispute), one has been implemented prospectively after long delay (US FSC -49 months after the expiration of the original reasonable period of time) and one was implemented after 10 months' delay (Australia Leather). The one subsidies case under the Agreement on Agriculture -Canada Dairy -also took a long time to implement (28 months after expiration of the reasonable period of time).
67 Thus, of the five subsidies cases, two remain unimplemented and the other three took years, on average, to be implemented.
SPS cases have also proved to be difficult in respect of implementation. As of the end of 2004, two cases were in subsequent panel proceedings (EC Hormones and Japan Apples). Even if found to be WTO-consistent now, EC implementation in Hormones occurred some 59 months after expiration of the reasonable period of time -a period explained in part by the need for it to undertake new scientific studies and in part by the its complex legislative procedures. The two cases where implementation has been 66 I have included the three cases (EC Hormones, US FSC and US 1916 Act) where implementation is now disputed, but where it is clear that implementation occurred only long after the expiration of the reasonable period of time. 67 The other two cases under the Agriculture Agreement were implemented within the reasonable period of time.
accepted took a long time to implement following expiration of the set reasonable period of time (Australia Salmon -23 months and Japan Agricultural Products -20 months).
There have also been problems with implementation in the trade remedies area, although to a large extent, the implementation problems in this area mainly concern the United States. In three of the seven cases involving the US, the problem is or was the need for congressional action (1916 Act, Byrd, Steel AD -Japan); and in two of the cases, implementation is only contested and may still be upheld or accepted (EC-12 and Lumber CVD). In the other two US cases, the delay was not all that great (DRAMS and Steel CVD -Germany).
68 It should be underlined, of course, that the total time taken to challenge a national trade remedy measure in WTO dispute settlement -from consultation request to implementation deadline, combined with the fact that implementation may often be accomplished by a revision (as opposed to the elimination) of the challenged measure, means that the WTO dispute settlement system may not provide a particularly effective means of mitigating the trade impact of trade remedy measures.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the three non-US cases involving the TRIPS Agreement have been implemented promptly, 69 but the two US cases, which require congressional action to revise statutory provisions, have not been implemented.
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Based on the foregoing, it would appear that the problem WTO agreements for implementation of dispute settlement results are the Subsidies and SPS Agreements. In the case of subsidies, the problem may be that an industry that is able to obtain governmental subsidies in the first place (whether through political power or by convincing the government that the national interest justify the subsidies) is likely to be able to delay implementation. In the case of the SPS Agreement, it would appear that public concerns over food safety and the impact of those concerns on politicians has been a significant problem that has delayed implementation in SPS cases. In addition, the fact that one of the subsidy cases and all of the SPS cases involve agricultural products -an area that is new to international oversight -may be an additional complicating factor in slowing implementation. In any event, any attempt to improve the implementation record at the WTO must take account of these apparent problem areas. In addition, it is worth mentioning that the overall time taken for safeguards and trade remedy cases may mean that even prompt implementation, typically by removal or revision of the contested measure, will not control improper use of safeguard and trade remedy measures. Thus, other remedies may need to be considered.
IV.
Where are Reforms Needed? 68 The only other case in this category is EC Bed Linen. Although the record suggests that the consultation and implementation phases of WTO dispute settlement work reasonably well, it is appropriate to consider whether additional reforms would be useful, especially in respect of implementation. The following sections discuss reforms that have been proposed in the ongoing dispute settlement reform negotiations. In one sense, these discussions started in the 1998 DSU Review process and have continued to this day.
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During these discussions, WTO members have usually expressed general satisfaction with the operation of the DSU, but they have also proposed myriad changes. This section will discuss some of the more important reforms proposed by WTO members or others in respect of improving the consultation and implementation phases of dispute settlement. Particular attention is given to the reforms that the chairman of the negotiating group on dispute settlement proposed in an attempt to conclude the negotiations in May 2003, since at that time he apparently thought that they had a chance of being accepted, although no agreement was in fact reached.
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A.
Consultations
The preliminary conclusions reached in part II suggest that the consultation procedure works relatively well in promoting mutually agreed solutions despite its informality. Indeed, given the brevity of the minimally required consultation period (71 days 73 ), the significant filtering effect of the consultation process is a small price to pay in time for that benefit. What sorts of reforms have been proposed to the consultation process? 74 
Transparency
As the discussion of the results of consultations makes clear, it is often not possible to ascertain precisely what happens in consultations, particularly when that is the only stage in a dispute. The Chairman's Text would modify the existing requirement to notify settlements contained in DSU article 3.6 so as to specify when they should be notified (within 60 days) and that they should contain sufficient information so that they may be evaluated by other WTO members. I would, in addition, argue that the member requesting consultations should be required to indicate the status of the consultations on an annual basis. While this would impose a minor administrative burden, it is in the 72 The proposals were contained in the so-called Chairman's Text, found in TN/DS/9. 73 Although the DSU specifies a minimum period of 60 days for consultations, there is an accepted practice that a request for the establishment of a panel should not be made before expiration of the formally required 60-day period. Given the advance notice required for meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body, there is in fact a period of 71 days at a minimum between the request for consultations and the establishment of a panel. It has been proposed to cut the 60-day period to 30 days, but this may be impractical as arranging the necessary meetings may take more time. 74 interests of the WTO, its members and others to know what happens to matters brought into the WTO dispute settlement system.
The Problem of Good Faith in Consultations
There are complaints by some WTO members that the consultation process is not useful, or at least not as useful as it could or should be. Some of these complaints are based on experiences where the consultations were not particularly helpful in resolving the dispute, but were rather treated as an annoying procedural step to be overcome as soon as possible. It is undoubtedly true that there are such cases. But that does not demonstrate that the consultation requirement is undesirable. Rather, it highlights that some serious disputes require resolution in the panel/Appellate Body process and that is obvious from the beginning. For example, the European Communities argued in the Bananas III case that the consultations in that case did not serve the purpose for which they were intended, i.e., there was no mutually agreed solution reached. 75 Given the history of the case, it is scarcely surprising that the consultations did not succeed. It seemed clear that the EC system was discriminatory in a number of ways detrimental to the complaining parties and beneficial to EC operators. The prospect that the EC would change its system to the detriment of its operators was scarcely likely. The case was inevitably going to be resolved only after a panel ruled whether the discriminatory aspects were WTO-consistent or not. Other cases like that will occur from time to time. The advantage of the filtering provided by the consultation requirement remains, however, as long as some panels are avoided.
3.
Consultations as a "Discovery" Mechanism
There are also complaints that the consultation process should be made more useful in preparing cases for the panel stage. For example, it has been proposed that a consulting party should be required to respond in writing to questions propounded by the other party so as to clarify the issues for the panel process. In my view, the imposition of such a requirement would present a risk of inappropriately mixing the political aspects with the legal aspects of dispute settlement. While the clarification of issues in consultations is certainly not to be discouraged, it is the panel process that should ultimately perform that function. 76 The basic function of consultations is to force the parties to talk to each other in a meaningful way before they initiate the formal panel process. To add a discovery function to the consultation process would transform it from a political one into a legal one. To the extent that that occurs, it is less likely that the parties will settle their differences. Instead, the focus will be on tactics designed to 75 Panel Report on European Communities -Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, adopted, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, on September 25, 1997, WT/DS27/R/--, paras. 7.17-7.21. The panel rejected the EC argument and it was one of the few issues not appealed. 76 In India-Patents, the Appellate Body wrote: "All parties engaged in dispute settlement under the DSU must be fully forthcoming from the very beginning both as to the claims involved in a disputes and as to the facts relating to those claims. Claims must be clearly stated. Facts must be disclosed freely. This must be so in consultations as well as in the more formal setting of panel proceedings." Appellate Body Report on India -Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, adopted on January 16, 1998, WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 94. improve, or at least to avoid harming, one's position before a panel. As such, the consultation process would involve lawyers to a greater extent and would need to be under third-party supervision, a virtual impossibility without the creation of a permanent panel body. Moreover, the formalization of the consultation procedure would probably work to the disadvantage of developing countries, since it would raise the stakes early in the dispute settlement process before they may have arranged for legal assistance.
Of course, if a "discovery" function in consultations were to fill a pressing need in the WTO dispute settlement system, it would have to considered even if there were negative consequences for the settlement of cases. However, it would seem that need can be as effectively (indeed, probably more effectively) met by continuing to allow parties to request panels to ask questions of the other party in the panel process. 
Improving the Prospects of Settlement in Consultations
Given the political nature of the consultation process and its goal of promoting mutually agreed solutions, if there is a change to be made to the consultation process, it should be one that makes such solutions more, not less, likely. One possibility that could be usefully explored is a greater use of mediation or conciliation. While this possibility is specifically provided for in Article 5 of the DSU and is said to be available at any time, in fact it is virtually never used. Part of the reason for that may be that the role of mediator is assigned to the Director-General and it is probably the case that most DirectorsGeneral would prefer not to insert themselves into disputes. Indeed, in most cases it is probably better if they do not since by doing so they could compromise their position as an impartial party in other contexts, such as negotiations.
This suggests that an expansion of the mediation/conciliation role will probably have to be implemented through use of non-Secretariat persons, or, if technically in the Secretariat, at least persons having no other function besides mediation/conciliation. One can imagine this role being played by retired officials, whether from the Secretariat, the Appellate Body or diplomats with panel experience. If supported by a small legal staff, such individuals might well be able to give the parties a clearer idea of the likely outcome of a case, such that the outlines of a settlement might be easier to achieve. Given that this role would only be a limited, part-time one, there would not be great expense involved.
Thus, if it is desired to improve the consultation process, the focus should not be on making it more legalistic or in giving what happens in consultations special meaning in what later occurs before a panel and the Appellate Body, but rather through the introduction of procedures that make settlements more likely. When one distinguishes the political and legal aspects of WTO dispute settlement, this approach seems obvious and compelling. 77 Placing the questioning process under the control of panels would be necessary if the WTO dispute settlement system develops a concept that a respondent is not obligated to reply to allegations until a prima facie case is established. 
Implementation
Part III suggests that the major problem with implementation is that it sometimes does not occur and often occurs only after considerable delay. This suggests that serious consideration should be given (i) to speeding up the formal dispute settlement process and (ii) to improving the surveillance monitoring process 78 and, most importantly, improving the remedies that are available in the event of non-compliance.
Speeding Up the Formal Dispute Settlement Process
While the issue of timing has been raised in the DSU reform negotiations, in my view there has not been a serious discussion of the issue. The May 2003 Chairman's Text does not address significantly the issue of shortening time frames. Indeed, it is likely that the sequencing and remand proposals contained in the Text would greatly increase the time taken for some cases to be processed in the dispute settlement system. The additional 30 days provided for the Appellate Body could potentially add 30 days to every appeal. 79 Moreover, the additional SDT provisions and third-party rights may lead to more time being taken for briefing in some cases. The only time saving in the proposal is the elimination of the second meeting requirements for establishment of panels -which will save only a few weeks.
One can ask if it really matters if the time frames are extended. I think it does for two reasons. First, as noted above, one of the major complaints about the WTO dispute settlement system is that it takes too much time. 80 Even if a member adopts a clearly WTO-inconsistent measure, the complainant may have to wait for years before there is final decision of inconsistency. If the measure is eventually removed within the reasonable period of time, the complaining member will receive no compensation for the period that the measure was in effect. This fact may create a cynicism on the part of members and encourage measures (such as safeguards, to take one example) that cause trade damage but lead to no sanction of any kind so long as they are removed when the dispute settlement process finally runs its course. If anything, this problem of delay is serious over all and seems not to be improving. In the first four years or so of the system's operation (through April 1999), I calculated that the overall average time from panel establishment to report adoption was a bit over 15 months, as opposed to the 12 months' goal in the DSU for appealed cases (9 months for non-appealed cases). Recent statistics compiled by Mexico suggest that the 15 to 16 month average remains true 78 The proposed Chairman's Text contains a number of useful proposals in this regard, which I will not explore in this paper. 79 The proposal on an interim appellate report does not specify any time limit for that step, but if it were to be adopted, it would undoubtedly add some time to the overall appellate process, although I believe that it could be accomplished without difficulty in the extra 30 days provided to the Appellate Body in the Chairman's text. 80 today, even though the rate of non-appealed cases has doubled. 81 To this time, must be added the reasonable time for implementation, which I calculate as having averaged around 9 months. Second, since 1998 the United States has consistently (although not always with much emphasis) taken the position that DSU reforms should not add to the overall time to process cases. To the extent that it is serious and intends to insist on its position, 82 and given that certain reforms such as sequencing and remand are badly needed, any agreement on DSU reform will have to take a serious look at reducing some current time frames.
Even if an agreement on sequencing and remand did not require time savings elsewhere, it is arguable that the integrity and reputation of the system require them. If that is the case, what can be done to reduce time frames? A serious consideration of this issue requires a step-by-step examination of how savings might be achieved at each step of the panel, appellate and implementation process.
a. Panel composition
Once a panel has been established, the first major source of delay is in the composition of panel. Although this is foreseen to take 20-30 days in the DSU, 83 it typically takes much longer. For example, the average time for composition of the nine panels working in mid-January 2004 was 68 days (the median was 48 days), and all but one of them had been composed by the Director-General (i.e., not by agreement of the parties). A permanent panel system would save one and one-half to two months, on average, since panelists could be assigned immediately after establishment. Without such a system, it is difficult to imagine much improvement unless parties resort to the Director-General as soon as possible. Such resort seems unlikely.
b. Panel briefing
At the moment the DSU Appendix 3 guidelines provide for up to six weeks for the filing of the complainant's first written submission and up to three weeks thereafter for the respondent's submission. Although in my experience most complainants have insisted on the six-week period, there is no justification for it. They should know what their case is about and they largely control the timing of the proceeding through establishment and composition. Allowing them six weeks to prepare their initial submission is totally unnecessary. Beyond that, it is unfair to the respondent, which should have relatively more time to prepare a response since it does not know exactly 81 Id. 82 It was commonly said immediately after the Uruguay Round that the time limits in the DSU were driven by a US desire to fit the DSU process into the timing requirements of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. what the arguments will be. Complainants should be required to file their briefs within, at most, two weeks of panel composition and respondents should be given three or four weeks to respond. 84 This would save several weeks compared to the current practice. The opposition to this proposal seems to be based on a desire by complainants not to forego the strategic advantage they now have. But since that advantage is unfair, this change is clearly a very easy and fair way to save several weeks.
c. Panel meetings
Traditionally, panels have held two substantive meetings with parties. There have long been complaints that the first meeting is not all that useful since it is mainly a rehash of the contents of the first submissions, plus a bit of rebuttal by the complainant. In fact, it is not unusual for the key issues in a case not to be thoroughly developed until the second meeting, especially where a respondent is relying on an exception. As currently structured and understood, there would seem to be little time to be saved in the panel meetings. To do so, would essentially require the adoption of a one-meeting-only structure. This would save a month or so, but it would fundamentally alter the way disputes unfold. In a one-meeting system, if the complainant failed to present a prima facie case in its first submission, the matter could simply be dismissed. Now, the expectation is that the panel will make enquiries to clarify arguments, which may result in an inadequate case becoming adequate. Moreover, the Appellate Body has ruled that a panel may not refuse to consider claims within its terms of reference even if they are not raised as of the time of the first meeting. 85 Thus, the final scope of the complainant's case is not now known until the end of the second meeting (or even later, if the panel asks for more information and/or argument subsequent to the second meeting).
In the long run, I think that it will be appropriate to move to a one-meeting system. This will require greater preparation by complainants in making their initial submission and presenting their case. It will also permit greater efficiency in resolving cases since inadequately presented cases will simply be dismissed. This would be more judicial-like and would probably lead to more court-like proceedings, including with respect to assessment of written and oral evidence. The increased burden that this sort of change would put on complainants, especially developing-country complainants, makes it unpalatable. For the moment, the active role of the panel in defining and clarifying issues over the course of two meetings seems indispensable.
d.
Panel report preparation 84 Australia has proposed that complainants be required to file their first submissions even earlier.
TN/DS/W/49, p. 8 (within five days of composition). It had initially proposed setting an even earlier date. TN/DS/W/8, p. 5 (on filing a request for establishment of a panel). 85 I appreciate that in speaking of the burden of proof, the Appellate Body has suggested that there is a requirement that the complainant present a prima facie case before the respondent is required to respond. United States -Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 23 May 1997. In practice, that requirement is difficult to implement as would be done in a court because of the expectation, if not duty, of inquiry and clarification that panels bear and the mere existence of two required meetings with the parties. The consequence is that cases change and develop between the two meetings.
There are four aspects of report preparation that should be mentionedpreparation of the descriptive part, preparation of the substantive report, the interim review stage and translation. The preparation of the descriptive part and the substantive part of the report occur simultaneously, so that saving time with respect to the descriptive part will not necessarily result in the earlier issuance of the final report. However, the Secretariat's resources for panel support are generally overtaxed. Thus, reducing input on the descriptive part will free resources that in some instances can be used to support the earlier completion of the substantive report. The current efforts to have parties supply executive summaries of their arguments, which then effectively become the descriptive part of the report, should be made obligatory.
As to the drafting of the substantive report, there are two changes that could save time. The first is the adoption of the permanent panel system. Now, the ad hoc panels must reassemble to discuss the drafting of the report. The difficulty of scheduling such meetings (most panelists have other jobs) inevitably adds to the time it takes to produce a report. Permanent panelists would be expected to spend more time in Geneva and be available on short notice. They would also be used to working with one another and with report preparation in general. Second, a serious attempt should be made to reduce the length of the reports. Not infrequently it seems to me that they could be pruned significantly and usefully in a serious edit. That takes time, of course, and ad hoc panelists are unlikely to be in a position to do that -it is more important for them to make sure they all agree on what has been written than to figure out how to make reports shorter. Somehow, the drafting ethos needs to change.
The interim report requirement adds five weeks to the process. I think that it has some useful features, but its elimination would be an easy way to save five weeks. It may be necessary to forego the limited benefits of interim reports if all of the changes prolonging the process are made. Moreover, those benefits could be maintained by allowing parties to file motions with the panel to correct or clarify the report while it is being translated.
The question of translation is a matter of resources. Generally, dispute settlement reports are given priority (with the appellate reports given the highest priority). With greater resources, a couple of weeks could probably be saved in most cases, although there will always be times when negotiations or important meetings will result in a backlog of translation work.
e. Panel report adoption
Perhaps the best example of unnecessary time in the DSU process is the 60 days provided for adoption of the panel report or appeal in lieu thereof. That time could easily be reduced to 30 days. While governments that have lost a case claim that they need all of the time to decide whether to appeal because of the need to consult with interested parties and deal with complex inter-agency decision-making, the reality is that they know the result of the case when they receive the interim report and could (indeed, they should) start any necessary decision-making at that time. Even if the interim report phase is eliminated, the 60-day period should be reduced by at least two to three weeks.
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f.
Appeal and adoption of report
It would seem difficult to reduce the time taken for appeals significantly, although I see no reason to expand the time (unless an interim review procedure is added). Indeed, at the moment, even though the Appellate Body regularly takes 90 days from the notice of appeal to circulate its report, the date on the signature page is often earlier, suggesting that but for translation fewer than 90 days are actually required in many cases. It would, however, be possible to save two weeks by providing for faster adoption of Appellate Body reports. It has typically taken 25 days or so for adoption, which is required to occur within 30 days by DSU Article 14. If a DSB meeting is automatically scheduled on issuance, the average could become 11 days.
g. Reasonable period for implementation
It was always unfortunate that the major WTO players in the early WTO cases insisted on 15 months for implementation (US -Gasoline; Japan -Alcohol Taxes, Canada -Periodicals and EC -Bananas). While the average has fallen to nine months or so, and it is now clearly accepted that the 15 months referred to as a guide for arbitration is not to be viewed as a minimum or standard time, 87 these periods are still too long. Under the standard approach to setting the period, the focus is on the length of the legislative process, which rewards complex systems. It seems to me that having a complex legislative system is fine and perhaps even admirable, but should not give a violator a reward by lengthening the penalty-free period during which it is able to inflict damage on others. The reasonable period of time should be capped at a level lower than 15 months, if necessary with some leeway for developing countries in special circumstances. A period of six or nine months should be sufficient. That means that some Members will have great difficulty complying on time, but the fact that they will become subject to suspension of concessions or other remedy should have a salutary effect in focusing their efforts on implementation.
h. Sequencing
The Chairman's Text contained a proposal on sequencing and there seems to be general agreement that this or a similar change is needed and important in that it clarifies ambiguities in the DSU text. However, if improving time frames is an important consideration, then certain changes would be desirable. First, the 90-day period for having the compliance panel report is probably unrealistic, unless it is provided that normally the panel will meet only once with the parties and will not issue an interim 86 One could argue that the process of DSB adoption could simply be eliminated. I tend to favor its continuance because I think that it is useful and important to the system to focus members' attention on the results of specific cases and invite them to comment. See Davey, supra note 74. 87 report. That was the procedure followed by the only panel to date that met the 90-day deadline (Bananas). In some cases, this expedited schedule may not be appropriate (e.g., if experts must be consulted), but every effort needs to be made to keep this process a relatively quick one. 88 Second, the Bananas case also demonstrated that the level of nullification of impairment, which is the difficult issue in deciding on the level of suspension, can be done at the same time as determining the consistency of the new measure. Indeed, if it is so done, then the reasoning on that issue would be subject to appeal, which would be desirable in any event. While care must be taken to ensure that these proceeding are not so expedited as to compromise the quality of the panel and appellate reports (after all, some of these cases have been as complex as the original proceedings), this is a stage of the proceeding that can add a great deal of time to the overall amount of time required to process a case. Thus, care must be taken to see that compliance proceedings do not drag out unnecessarily.
i. Conclusion
Making all of the suggested changes could save a lot of time, especially if a permanent panel system is adopted. 88 Interestingly, the provision on remand in the Chairman's Text (see Part II.10 supra) provides for a possible extension from 90 days to 6 months, even though a remanded case is the same case, whereas a compliance panel case is usually different. 89 I suspect that adoption of a permanent panel system could result in further time savings, but I suspect that over time, such a system would become a bit more bureaucratic, and hence a bit slower. Accordingly, I have not assumed that such efficiencies would occur in this discussion.
In considering how to improve the implementation record of the WTO dispute settlement system, it is necessary first to consider the current remedies for nonimplementation and how they are structured. It is probably the case that the overall positive record of implementation in the WTO is due to the good faith desire of its members to see the dispute settlement system work effectively. The more active users of the system are repeat players, and they appear as both complainants and respondents. Accordingly, it is in their overall interests that the system function effectively. However, there will be cases where such good faith cannot be relied upon. When a WTO member faces difficulty in implementation, the issue quickly becomes one of assessing the consequences of non-implementation. That in turn requires a consideration of the nature and structure of the WTO's remedies for non-compliance with DSB rulings and recommendations.
In the event of non-implementation within the reasonable period of time provided, the DSU provides two potential remedies, both of which are said to be temporary ones pending implementation.
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Those remedies are compensation and the suspension of concessions (often simply called "retaliation").
To date, with one exception, compensation has not often been used, except to excuse compliance for a limited period of time. 91 The exception was US Copyright, where the US made a cash payment to the EC to excuse three years or so of non-compliance. The period covered by the compensation ended as of 31 December 2004, and no extension has been announced as of this writing. I will not give further consideration to compensation as a remedy in this introduction.
Except for minor matters, the political problems that preclude implementation will probably also prevent reasonable compensation. While the idea of "forced" compensation has been raised, 92 there are obvious implementation problems in dealing with a member that is already not in compliance with its WTO obligations.
The suspension of concessions is typically thought of as the basic remedy for nonimplementation of WTO dispute settlement results. In fact, however, it has not often been used. The GATT Contracting Parties authorized it only once 93 and it was supposedly never actually implemented. In the WTO to date, suspension of concessions has been authorized and used in only four cases: by the US in EC Bananas; by the US and Canada in EC Hormones; by the EC in US FSC; and by the EC, Japan, Canada and Mexico in US Byrd. It has been authorized, but not used by Ecuador in EC Bananas, by Canada in Brazil Aircraft, by Brazil in Canada Guarantees and by several members in US Byrd. The level of suspension was arbitrated in US 1916 Act, but the EC never sought authority to suspend concessions.
To understand the impact of an authorization to suspend concessions, it is important to recall that WTO remedies are prospective. The level of suspension is calculated from the end of the reasonable period of time. In addition, it is important to 90 DSU, art. 3.7. 91 For example, this was the case in Japan Alcohol Taxes, Turkey Textiles, and US Line Pipe. consider the two principal aims of suspension -to restore the balance of concessions that was upset when one member violated its obligations (a temporary aim since compliance is the preferred result); and to give that member an incentive to comply. 94 The current problem with achieving the first aim -rebalancing -is that if retaliation is authorized, rebalancing takes place at a lower level of trade liberalization that had been agreed to. It would be desirable if a remedy could be devised that would not lead to less liberalization overall. Moreover, retaliation harms the member imposing the higher tariffs as well as the target of the retaliation.
In respect of the second aim -incentive to comply -there are two issues -timing and level of compensation or retaliation. At present, because remedies are prospective, there is an incentive initially to delay the time at which point they might be implemented, such as by seeking a long reasonable period of time for compliance and then forcing the complainant to go through an Article 21.5 panel (and Appellate Body) proceeding. Moreover, if the threat of retaliation does not work, it is possible that the actual existence of retaliation will become viewed as the status quo and a long-term solution, even though the WTO rules in theory require compliance. This is a real possibility given that under the DSU the level of retaliation is to be equivalent to (i.e., is not to exceed) the level of nullification or impairment. 95 In other words, the offending member is not to be penalized for its non-implementation.
There is a more general problem with suspension of concessions. While it seems to work when threatened by a large country against a smaller one, and has worked when implemented by one major power against another, it may not be an effective remedy for a small country (even if it can target sensitive large country sectors such as copyright holders). Moreover, the EC Bananas and EC Hormones cases show that it is not always effective, at least not immediately, between major powers. It should be noted, however, that retaliation by the EC against the US seemed to have a political effect in the FSC case that led to US implementation, even if the significance of the economic impact of the retaliation was not clear. In addition, the EC and others' threat of retaliation seemed to work in the US Steel Safeguards case. 96 Nonetheless, occasional inefficacy of suspension of concessions and the unfavorable position in which it leaves developing countries may soon combine to create a serious credibility problem for the system that must be confronted.
These considerations lead to the obvious question of whether there are other remedies beyond compensation and retaliation that might be more effective in the WTO context. One obvious possibility would be the payment of fines or damages. One obvious problem would be the disparity in fine-paying ability among WTO members. The system would have to be designed to avoid the possibility that rich members could effectively buy their way out of obligations in a way not available to the poor members. That might be accomplished by tying the amount of fines to the size of the member's economy, or otherwise provide for a sliding scale that would minimize "discrimination" against poor members. While a system of fines or damages has not been discussed in much detail in the past, such provisions have been included in free trade agreements recently negotiated by the United States. 98 For example, under their provisions, after the level of suspension of concessions had been set, the non-complying country would have the option of paying an amount equal to one-half level of suspension in lieu of having the concessions suspended. These provisions may suggest that the traditional government unwillingness to submit to the possibility of fines may be changing.
b. Specific proposals
In light of the above-described general considerations, what practical improvements might be suggested to improve implementation of WTO dispute settlement decisions. I believe that several changes should be given serious consideration. In particular, I think that the WTO remedies for non-implementation should incorporate (i) the possibility of substituting fines or damages as a remedy in lieu of suspension of concessions; (ii) some degree of retroactivity, so as to encourage compliance within the reasonable period of time; and (iii) some adjustment mechanism to increase the sanctions over time, so as to preclude non-compliance from becoming an acceptable status quo position. I discuss each in turn.
i. Money payments
Because suspension of concessions has been used generally only by members of the Quad, I think it is evident that another remedy more meaningful to the typical WTO member is needed. The obvious possibility is to allow a prevailing party to choose between suspension of concessions and receipt of a periodic monetary payment. While there may be enforcement problems in that it may difficult to ensure the payment is made, the right to receive a payment will still be more valuable than the never-used and probably unusable right to suspend concessions. There are some signs that payments of fines or damages may be gaining in acceptability, as demonstrated by their inclusion in US free trade agreements. Moreover, the US Congress recently authorized around $50 million for the US to use to pay "damages" in trade cases. However, to date, it has only appropriated about $3 million for this purpose (for use in the US Copyright case).
Perhaps the greatest downside of relying on money payments is enforceability. One way to solve the enforceability problem would be to require WTO members to create funds from which damages could be paid without specific legislative approval. This should not be all that controversial as it is the way I believe that civil judgments against governments are typically paid. In any event, if a payment is not made when due, there would always be the fallback of suspension of concessions.
ii.
Retrospective assessment
The prospective nature of WTO remedies currently gives countries no incentive to comply promptly and may even encourage foot-dragging. To minimize this problem and to create incentives for prompt compliance, it should be provided that any remedy (whether retaliation or money payment) will be calculated from a date prior to the date set for implementation (e.g., date of adoption of the relevant report or date of panel establishment or even earlier). Since no remedy would be imposed if implementation occurs within the reasonable period of time, there would be an incentive to meet that deadline for implementation.
iii. Increasing sanctions over time
Increasing sanctions over time would also seem to offer some real possibilities for improving implementation. Such a procedure would help to avoid the perception that the payment of fines or damages is simply an alternative to compliance. In a sense, this concept has been used by the EC in the FSC case, where the duty it imposed on a long list of US products started at 5% was increased at a rate of 1% each month. The monthly change focused attention on the case each month and the impending increase, even if small, created an incentive to act so as to forestall it. In US congressional debates on the FSC implementation legislation, at least some members of Congress have made this point. Because of the huge size of the FSC sanctions -$4 billion -a phase-in made practical sense in any event. But the same concept could be used in other cases, so long as it is agreed to allow sanctions to increase over time from the initial amount.
c. Concluding thoughts on improving implementation
In Part III, the point was made that any solution attempting to address the WTO's implementation problems must deal effectively with (i) the recent US failures to implement and to the occasional foot-dragging by the Quad countries (and Australia) and (ii) with the particular implementation problems in the areas of subsidies, SPS and trade remedies.
In terms of US failures to implement, it is, of course, a hopeful sign that the US Congress in late 2004 enacted legislation to implement the FSC and 1916 Act decisions (subject to transitional issues). In the latter case, implementation was due to the inclusion by the leadership of a provision to repeal the 1916 Act in a conference report where neither the House nor Senate versions of the bill at issue contained such a provision. This suggests some concern on the part of the US, including the Congress, not to be seen as ignoring WTO obligations. In any event, to the extent that pressure can be effectively put on the US to implement WTO rulings, it would seem to me that the above changes would increase such pressures. The same is true in the case of the other Quad members. In particular, the adoption of questionable implementation measures would be much less likely if a system of retrospective remedies was put in place. Moreover, the provision of increased sanctions that would increase the cost over time of non-implementation would clearly provide an incentive not to delay implementation. In the end, of course, WTO remedies may be insufficient to influence the behavior of major powers, but the proposed changes in the remedy system would seem to be a positive step in the right direction.
The use of retrospective remedies and increased sanctions over time would likely help solve the particular implementation problems that are seen in the subsidy and SPS areas. In each case, the cost of non-compliance would increase and that would help offset the political opposition to implementation. That would not necessarily be the case in respect of safeguards and trade remedies. As outlined above, the assumption of the current system (and the proposed changes thereto) is that compliance within the set reasonable period of time would absolve a country from suffering the application of any remedy. Yet in the area of safeguards and trade remedies that would still allow a country to impose the safeguard or trade remedy, enjoy its effect and only be compelled to remove it after the WTO dispute settlement procedure had run its course. Thus, questionable safeguards and trade remedies might continue to be imposed and then removed after a couple of years of disrupting trade. It would seem to me that the only way to solve this problem would be to require payment of reparations if the imposition of such measures are found to be WTO-inconsistent. I think that these cases are often too complex to expect that a system of provisional remedies or accelerated timeframes could make much difference. Since these measures often stop trade and may not result in the collection of duties in any event, a rule on refund of duties would also not address the problem in general. Providing for reparations (damages to trade flows) might work. However, while reparations are the standard remedy in international law for violations of a state's obligations, importing such a concept into the WTO would probably be viewed by WTO members as a more drastic and less acceptable change than the adjustments to the current remedies proposed above.
V. Conclusions
The consultations process under the DSU has worked effectively and only minor improvements need be made to that process. While the implementation record of the WTO dispute settlement system is fairly good, the problem of a few longstanding problems cases of non-implementation suggest that improvements in the remedies for non-compliance should be considered seriously. 
